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101 
BOOK REVIEW  
ESCAPING LABOR LAW’S MATRIX 
Governance by Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance, Alain 
Supiot, (Saskia Brown trans., Bloomsbury, 2017, 336 pp). 
reviewed by Alan Bogg† 
1999 was an auspicious year. It was the year that I began in earnest as a 
student of labor law in the neoliberal twilight years of the twentieth century, 
with my discipline in its seeming death throes. It was also the year that the 
critically acclaimed science fiction film The Matrix was released. The actor 
Keanu Reeves had been required to read Jean Baudrillard’s famous work 
Simulacra and Simulation as a philosophical prelude to reading the film 
script.1 The Matrix is a meditation on the nature of real human experience. 
The film is set in a dystopian future where intelligent machines have 
subjugated human beings who are encased in pods to harvest their bioelectric 
energies. The matrix is a simulated reality within which the conscious minds 
of the enslaved people are imprisoned. It is rather like a scaled-up version of 
Robert Nozick’s “experience machine”2: a computer-generated mirage that 
masks their real situation of enslavement. The heroic quest of this small band 
of liberated human beings was to smash through the simulation and to live a 
real human life outside of the matrix. Emancipation meant that the human 
beings must reclaim the real territory of lived human experience.  
Twenty years on, a reading of Professor Alain Supiot’s Governance by 
Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance reveals a manifesto of 
profound importance.3 It is a stirring call for the emancipation of the human 
being, and the repositioning of the human being at the very center of work 
and politics. It is underpinned by rigorous scholarship on a grand scale and it 
 
 †  Professor of Labour Law, University of Bristol. 
I am grateful to Serena Crawshay-Williams, Ruth Dukes, Mark Freedland and Tonia Novitz for very 
helpful discussion of an earlier draft. 
 1. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Glaser trans., 1994). 
 2. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (2001). 
 3. ALAIN SUPIOT, GOVERNANCE BY NUMBERS: THE MAKING OF A LEGAL MODEL OF ALLEGIANCE 
(Saskia Brown trans., 2017). 
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scintillates with brilliant insights.  For Supiot, the fate of work and the fate 
of politics are intertwined. In the book, Supiot argues that freedom depends 
upon human beings reclaiming the territory and repudiating the map.4 What 
does this mean? The territory describes the situation where the human 
imagination can leave its imprint in the world through meaningful agency in 
labor and democratic politics. The map is the matrix-like simulacrum of 
numbers, metrics, targets and statistics which provide the structure and 
content of new forms of governance in the public and private spheres. 
Supiot’s fundamental claim is that human beings are becoming progressively 
more alienated from politics and work through the tyranny of numbers. This 
treatise stands in a long and distinguished line of works in French social 
theory on the interplay between domination and emancipation in modern 
society. The work of Michel Foucault is in point here who, like Supiot, was 
also a Professor of the prestigious Collège de France. 
Governance by Numbers thus provides a grand theory of labor law’s fate 
in the early decades of the twenty-first century. This sets it apart from more 
particularized engagements with specific sectors of work activity (for 
example, care work), the regulatory challenges of gig work, the phenomenon 
of precarious work, or the stability and prevalence of the standard 
employment relationship. Supiot’s distinctive contribution is to examine the 
multiple linkages among conceptualizations of the state, legal form, public 
and private governance, and the constitution of work.  In this way, he is 
concerned to penetrate the deeper causes of work’s degradation in the modern 
era. This process is linked umbilically to the degradation of legal form and 
of democratic politics. This contamination across different spheres of public 
life is being driven by the normativity of numbers and metrics. 
The book is divided into two parts. The first part traces the decline of 
law as a cultural form that instantiates shared meanings between citizens of 
a political community. Its “overthrow” has been facilitated by the rise of a 
“cybernetic imaginary” where individuals are expected “to react in real time 
to the multiple signals they receive, in order to meet the targets they are 
assigned.”5 This is the world of algorithms, metrics, instant feedback, 
indicators, and benchmarking. The second part explores some of the 
consequences of “governance by numbers” for the structuring of employment 
relations. Supiot suggests that the withering away of legal form and state 
sovereignty has led to the emergence of feudal forms of allegiance between 
networks of stronger and weaker actors. While many labor lawyers will be 
familiar with “fissuring” discourse in the modern economy,6 Supiot’s 
 
 4. Id. at 169. 
 5. Id. at 10. 
 6. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014). 
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intriguing thesis attaches political significance to this phenomenon. Fissuring 
is not merely an economic process: it represents a new form of political 
organization based upon vassalage. Having identified these complex 
dynamics over centuries of legal and political development, and across a 
panoramic comparative sweep, Governance by Numbers then explores the 
possibilities for a reconstitution of labor law and the politics of work. This is 
a remarkable and ambitious work. Before evaluating Supiot’s main claims, it 
is important first to clarify the structure of the argument. 
The first part of the book traces the deep historical roots of governing 
by law and its gradual eclipse by “governance by numbers.” For Supiot, rule 
by law represents a particular aesthetic imaginary. The contours of this 
imaginary are painted in bold historical strokes, across different cultures, and 
through an examination of Greek and Roman legal traditions. There are of 
course important cultural variations in this ideal of government by law, and 
Supiot is sensitive to these differences. However, this symbolic ideal of law 
might today be understood as the “Rule of Law.” It would reject the reductive 
thesis that law is simply an instrument, like a sharp knife, designed to achieve 
specified ends with ruthless efficiency. Instead, the Rule of Law represents 
an ideal of government where citizens are consecrated as citizens with dignity 
and autonomy and are governed by shared rules.7 The law addresses them as 
agents with dignity, and it does so in the normative terminology of 
obligations. The law is not simply coercive brute force like the threats of a 
gangster. Legal texts and political institutions provide a cultural structure of 
solidarity in the political community. Supiot’s account of legal and historical 
development traces the slow degradation of these ideal of “government,” and 
its progressive substitution by “governance”:  
Where “government” relies on subordinating individuals, “governance,” 
in line with its cybernetic vision, relies on programming them. . . . The 
subordinated worker obeys the rules he is given, whereas the programmed 
worker reacts to the information reaching him from his environment. The 
move from subordination to programme is absolutely central to our 
contemporary representation of human action.8 
Supiot’s careful tracing of this movement is legal scholarship in the 
genre of the longue duree, and this makes it a rather unusual work in the labor 
law canon. For example, chapter 4 exposes the latency of “social harmony 
by numbers” in ancient political and legal practices. It is an excursus that 
takes us through Pythagoras, Plato and the Renaissance Neo-Platonists. 
Numbers represented secret truths of an imminent rational order in the world. 
This inspired the hope that esoteric knowledge of mathematical harmonies 
 
 7. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS LIBERATE (2012).  
 8. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 29. 
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might provide models for the ordering of citizens in political communities. 
Given these roots in esoteric mystical practices, we are then led through the 
emergence of a normativity of numbers in early forms of legal practice in 
chapter 5. This is reflected in the legal obligation of accounting (whereby the 
account becomes the authoritative accreditation of a truth through the 
medium of a numerical image); the use of statistics and quantification as a 
technique of government, identifying regularities and patterns of social 
behavior in order to manage populations; the rise of probabilistic reasoning 
in adjudication; and the use of quantification as a basis for designing 
legislative interventions. In this way, the law’s encounter with quantification 
is a longstanding one. While the harnessing of scientific rationality and 
mathematical expertise is both inevitable and productive, it is an encounter 
that has also been fraught with risk. The Supiot narrative implies that the 
imagined superior objectivity of quantification has always threated to 
undermine the authority of law as a symbolic medium.  
Chapters 6 and 8 provide the most interesting contemporary insights 
into Supiot’s thesis of the gradual entrenchment of “government by 
numbers.” Chapter 6 explores the “dethronement of law” in two seemingly 
different political situations, the Soviet-style “planned economy” and the 
Anglo-American neoliberal paradigm. The modern era represents a 
“hybridisation” of these models which have conspired to displace law in 
favor of quantification. In the planned economy, law is reduced to an 
instrument or tool to implement the detailed numerical planning determined 
by the central planning committee. According to Supiot, this was a form of 
“government by numbers.”9 It was not yet a form of governance because the 
individual was still subjected to coercive control implemented through legal 
directives. In neoliberal thinking, the law is also a mere technical tool that 
provides a minimal framework within which contracting parties maximize 
their self-interest through bargaining.  
In both ideal-types, the conceptualization of law as a coercive 
instrument “most certainly represents a regression and shows a lack of 
understanding of the law as a nodal point in the domestication of power. Law 
is most certainly a technique of power, but it is a technique which binds and 
limits power.”10 This “dethronement of law” leads to its degradation as 
cultural form. Laws become a product to be bought and sold in the political 
marketplace to the highest bidder; they also become simply another resource 
to be allocated in a contract, perhaps through the designation of a private 
 
 9. Id. at 115. 
 10. Id. at 118. 
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arbitrator to “resolve disputes” or choice of law clauses in a global 
marketplace of legal systems. Ultimately, calculation becomes the norm,  
akin to a biological norm or a computer programme, it results from the 
interaction of individual calculations and it operates from within. The 
interiorisation, or eradication of heteronomy, is precisely what 
governance means: whereas government implies a commanding position 
above those governed . . . governance starts out from individual freedoms, 
not to limit but rather to programme them.11  
The fact that there has been a confluence between capitalism and 
communism appears to give this process an irresistible momentum. Chapter 
8 provides a powerful overview of the displacement of law by “governance 
by numbers” at multiple levels of normative activity. In each normative 
domain, there is a “system of self-adjusting interacting units automatically 
responding to signal inputs and feedback, as programmed by computer 
algorithms.”12 Parallel regulatory phenomena are identified at the levels of 
individual governance, corporate governance, public sector governance, 
European governance, and global governance. Quantification, 
benchmarking, and indicators pervade each of these levels of governance. 
This has corroded democratic principles across multiple regulatory levels. 
The second part examines the specific consequences of “governance by 
numbers” in the field of social law and the organization of work. This is more 
familiar intellectual territory for labor lawyers, though Supiot analyses that 
territory in new and interesting ways. In chapter 9, Supiot examines the 
phenomenon of “governance by numbers” and the friction that it generates at 
the interface with “government by laws.” In the employment context, the 
book offers important insights into the reconfiguration of Taylorism by 
modes of quantification. Under Taylorism, workers “were reduced to the 
status of cogs obeying mechanically the rules of the workshop and the 
rhythms of the machines.”13 Despite the promise of liberation through 
technological advancement, “governance by numbers” “ensnares managers 
and workers alike in feedback loops governed by numerical representations 
of the world increasingly disconnected from experience.”14 Or again, 
“Taylorism was based on the total subordination of workers to a rationalised 
system imposed from outside, whereas today the organization of work is 
predicated on programming.”15  
Supiot then traces the complex dynamics within protective labor law 
generated by this new figure of the “programmed worker.” For example, 
 
 11. Id. at 116. 
 12. Id. at 145. 
 13. Id. at 169. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 177. 
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there is an interesting discussion of sites of resistance from French health and 
safety law to the mental degradations wrought by dehumanized work.16 
These legal challenges to objectives-led management techniques provide 
opportunities for democratic empowerment, and Supiot accordingly rejects 
crude technological determinism. This chapter also gestures tantalizingly to 
another possibility, which is that labor law developments can also be a Trojan 
Horse for the deeper penetration of “governance by numbers” into working 
life. Nearly twenty years ago, in the heyday of “third way” labor law in the 
United Kingdom, proposals emerged for new contractual paradigms based 
upon high-discretion contractual performance.17 On the face of it, this shift 
might be interpreted as an emancipatory development marking a transition 
from coercive subordination to cooperation and autonomy. Supiot’s powerful 
arguments provide a stark reminder that legal developments must always be 
assessed within the broader social, economic, and technological context. Just 
as formal subordination is eclipsed, new and more insidious forms of 
structural domination emerge. Autonomy must be assessed in its totality. 
Good faith and ideals of contractual cooperation may facilitate a state of self-
enslavement through the internalization of metrics. Self-enslavement is a 
pernicious form of domination precisely because its chains are not so 
tangible. 
Chapters 10 and 11 set out the core analytical theses of the second part 
of the book. Chapter 10 explores the contours of the “withering away of the 
state.” For Supiot, this is reflected most strongly in the erosion of the public 
sphere and of the sovereignty of state law. State law and the sovereignty of 
the state has been displaced by the narrowing of mandatory ius cogens norms 
in favor of ius dispositivum norms that can be modified or excluded through 
private ordering. It is also reflected in the expanding legal universe of 
proliferating norm-systems that can be opted into through employment 
contracts. Legal norms are becoming an object of consumer choice like shoes 
or sofas. Imagine being a platform driver in Barcelona, contracting with a 
platform provider in New York, with your employment disputes governed by 
employment laws in Amsterdam. In the most extreme versions of this 
phenomenon, employment contracts provide for compulsory and 
individualized private arbitration so that employment disputes are channeled 
out of the system of public courts entirely.18 In the United States, the public 
 
 16. Id. at 186. 
 17. Hugh Collins, Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness 30 INDUS. L.J. 17 
(2001). 
 18. MATTHEW FINKIN, AMERICAN LABOR AND THE LAW: DORMANT, RESURGENT, AND EMERGENT 
PROBLEMS 54-62 (2019). 
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courts have themselves been complicit in this privatization of public justice.19 
According to Supiot, “such legal forum shopping is of course incompatible 
with a system based on the rule of law, but it has its place in one based on 
rule by laws.”20 This is no doubt facilitated by the emergence of leximetrics, 
using numerical values and coding techniques to rank legal systems by 
business-friendly indicators, under the guidance of the World Bank.21 
According to Supiot, the vacuum created by the “withering of the state” 
and the “dethronement of law” explains the emergence of a new feudalism 
based upon “ties of allegiance.” This represents a situation where “the key 
idea is not that all should be subject to the same abstract law, but that each 
person should behave according to his or her place in the network. Each must 
serve the interests of those on whom he depends, and be able to count on the 
loyalty of those who depend on him.”22 On an initial encounter, these ideas 
of serfdom, loyalty, and vassalage seemed rather odd and obscure within the 
context of the current predicaments of labor law.23 I now incline to the view 
that there is considerable analytical power in this way of framing things. In 
particular, we start to see familiar phenomena from different angles. In a 
brilliant analysis of the “de-constitutionalisation” of collective labor rights in 
Greece, Ioannis Katsaroumpas has critiqued the dismantling of Greek social 
law through the use of economic conditionality tools by the Troika.24 While 
this narrative has been rather shocking to labor lawyers, witnessing 
constitutional norms dissolve like mist in an encounter with commercial debt 
arrangements, Supiot’s thesis of a new feudalism enables us to see how this 
might be a predictable and normal occurrence at the current political juncture.  
It also provides a new perspective on the ubiquitous discourse of “the 
fissured workplace.”25 In fissuring, there is a proliferating network of 
contracts parceling out productive activities to different contracting parties. 
So far, this has been conceptualized as an economic process that creates 
regulatory challenges for enforcement, namely, how to affix liability for 
employment standards to the “lead companies” in supply chains. Supiot’s 
feudalism thesis exposes fissuring as a political process that is subverting the 
sovereignty of law. This is a valuable corrective to underestimating the 
 
 19. Epic Sys. Corp. v Lewis 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the preclusion of group claims by mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts. 
 20. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 197. 
 21. For a recent exploration of the nature of leximetric research in labor, which exposes some 
difficulties with the World Bank methodology, see Simon Deakin, The Use of Quantitative Methods in 
Labour Law Research: An Assessment and Reformulation, 27 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 456 (2018). 
 22. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 212. 
 23. Though see ANDRE GORZ, RECLAIMING WORK: BEYOND THE WAGE-BASED SOCIETY (1999). 
 24. Ioannis Katsaroumpas, De-Constitutionalising Collective Labour Rights: The Case of Greece, 
47 INDUS. L.J 465 (2018). 
 25. WEIL, supra note 6.  
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significance of fissuring, and its connections to a wider crisis of democratic 
governance. It also implies that the regulatory responses to fissuring must be 
more than technical fixes to existing enforcement paradigms, such as the 
introduction of “joint employer” or “joint and several liability” into the 
regulatory armory. 
The book concludes with “ways forward.” This depends upon a 
reconstitution of labor law that recognizes “the anthropological dimension of 
work, understood in its broadest and most concrete sense of human beings’ 
need to inscribe into their everyday living environment the mental images 
which guide their action and collaboration.”26 Above all, this book is an elegy 
for the tragic loss of meaning in work and in law.27 In turn, the 
“anthropological dimension of work” depends upon the reconstitution of 
meaningful work. This invites a search for new forms of solidarity and the 
creation of new functions for the nation state in fostering solidarities: “the 
state’s role should be to guarantee the articulation between national solidarity 
and solidarity organizations within civil society and internationally, which 
are woven through these networks of allegiance.”28 This envisages a radical 
democratization of the political and economic spheres so that human agency 
can overcome the tyranny of numbers. This is the way out of the matrix. 
This is a book of significance and magnitude. Its intellectual power lies 
in its ability to jolt and disrupt the familiar ways of framing legal 
developments. Here are two examples, both of which originate in the domain 
of “protective” labor law. As labor lawyers, we have been accustomed to 
defending the citadel of social law from encroachment by the neoliberal 
barbarians at the gate. “Governance by numbers” demonstrates how the 
deepening of quantified domination is being secreted into ostensibly 
protective measures. 
The first example is in the context of working time regulation under the 
Working Time Directive. In Federación de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras 
(CCOO) v. Deutsche Bank SAE the question arose as to whether it was 
mandatory for an employer to maintain records of the actual duration of daily 
and weekly time worked by workers in order to facilitate the effective 
enforcement of working time rights.29 The case arose out of a legal claim 
brought by a Spanish trade union. Advocate General Pitruzzella’s Opinion 
was that monitoring and precise measurement of working time was a 
 
 26. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 288. 
 27. More than once, Supiot indicates the value of a psychoanalytic approach. The deeper themes in 
Supiot’s book reminded me very much of CARL JUNG, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL (W. S. Dell 
& Cary F. Baynes trans., Routledge 2001) (1933). 
 28. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 289. 
 29. Case C-55/18, Federación de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) v. Deutsche Bank SAE, 
2019 EU:C:2019:87. This reasoning has recently been endorsed by the European Court of Justice. 
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mandatory obligation, which flowed from the need to ensure effective 
enforcement of working time limits. My first reaction to this case was that it 
represented a solidification of worker protective principles in the scheme of 
working time principles. Supiot’s arguments might lead us towards a more 
cautious assessment. The intensification of monitoring, particularly though 
technologies and discrete forms of surveillance, may have dehumanizing 
effects on workers. Would protective labor laws legitimate the use of 
patented wristbands to track the physical movements of workers?30 Should 
this be calibrated to measure the intensity of activities so that working time 
limits might be fine-tuned even further? What about technology that 
pinpoints cognitive activities such as thinking time? It is often forgotten that 
the Working Time Directive is based upon a normative principle of the 
humanization of work.31 It is vital that this shadow-side of worker-protective 
labor laws is given fuller recognition, and Supiot’s thesis provides a novel 
conceptual grammar for doing this. 
The second example is drawn from some recent developments in U.K. 
labor law. In July 2017 “Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern 
Working Practices” was published.32 This report had been commissioned by 
the Government to examine working practices in the U.K. labor market, 
prompted by public concerns about exploitation, under-enforcement of 
labour standards, and the proliferation of classificatory problems of ‘false 
self-employment’ in the ‘gig economy’. It was a remarkable opportunity for 
a meaningful public conversation about the constitution of work. Alas, the 
Taylor Review did not have a Supiot. 
There have been critical engagements with some of the details of the 
review’s regulatory proposals.33 However, Supiot’s arguments point the way 
to a deeper critique of the review’s intellectual and political framework. First, 
there is a startling faith in technology to deliver “clarity” on the issue of 
employment status, with the review recommending the development of 
“online tools” to assist individuals in discovering the legal identity of the 
working arrangements.34 This presents the employment status 
characterization as a technical exercise. Where next from here? We might 
 
 30. Olivia Solon, Amazon patents wristband that tracks warehouse workers’ movements, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Jan. 31, 2018, 7:30 PM), www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/31/amazon-
warehouse-wristband-tracking. 
 31. Alan Bogg, Of Holidays, Work, and Humanisation: A Missed Opportunity?, 34 EUR. L. REV. 
738 (2009). 
 32. Matthew Taylor et al., Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices, GOV.UK 
(July 2017), www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/627671/good-work-
taylor-review-modern-working-practices-rg.pdf.  
 33. Katie Bales, Alan Bogg, & Tonia Novitz, ‘Voice’ and ‘Choice’ in Modern Working Practices: 
Problems with the Taylor Review 47 INDUS. L.J. 46 (2018). 
 34. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 39. 
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develop numerical values to attach to specific features of the work 
arrangements, and an overall score for the employment status threshold. This, 
of course, is precisely the lie of “governance by numbers.” Its effect is to 
depoliticize the question of the employment status enquiry, which must be 
understood as a creative political act in determining which of us has 
employment rights (and which of us does not). Dressing this up as a technical 
enquiry, to be assisted by new technology, obscures the politics of 
employment status. 
Secondly, the review proposes a new statutory definition for an 
intermediate category of employment status based upon “control.”35 Building 
upon Supiot’s important distinction between the “subordinated worker” and 
the “programmed worker,” to inscribe “control” into a new statutory 
definition would be to track a set of preoccupations with the “subordinated 
worker.” As the numbers of “programmed workers” expand in the economy, 
legal tests need to be supple enough to track those constitutive features of 
“programmed work.” The forms and techniques of domination are less overt 
for the “programmed worker” than for the “subordinated worker,” precisely 
because they are internalized forms of cognitive subjugation. A statutory test 
of control, focused on external indicia, risks deflecting the enquiry away from 
these elements in new forms of work arrangement. 
Thirdly, the review embodies a particular aesthetic style of discourse. 
For a review concerned with the future of work and its regulation, it is rather 
short in running to 115 pages. It contains lots of quantitative data in chapter 
4, setting out the current composition of the U.K. labor market in a variety of 
colorful graphs and charts. The text is interspersed with trendy line drawings 
of people in a variety of work poses. Yet these people are faceless. Supiot’s 
arguments have finally helped me to pin down what I have found so irritating 
about this report. The faceless figures signify a glossy and superficial piece 
of work that is devoid of cultural and intellectual substance at the symbolic 
level. The report ignores a rich corpus of case law stretching back over more 
than a century, where courts have grappled with and refined different 
approaches to employment status. Undoubtedly, this case law has formulated 
legal tests with manifold limitations at the technical level. It has displayed 
folly more than wisdom. Yet this body of jurisprudence is a rich repository 
of cultural meanings that provide the foundations of a common life and for a 
law that we have in common. Supiot’s thesis provides a powerful argument 
to the effect that the reconstitution of meaning in work is bound up with the 
reconstitution of meaning in our shared legal practices. This suggests that a 
reductive approach to legal reform, based upon a slim statutory definition that 
 
 35. Id at 36. 
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takes its year of enactment as Year Zero, is unlikely to be the best way 
forward.36 
Finally, the Government’s main response to date to the Taylor Review 
has been the implementation of a “Good Work Plan.”37 One plank in this 
strategy is dedicated to the promotion of “quality of work.”38 On its face, this 
might seem to invoke Supiot’s “anthropological dimension of work.” 
However, the proposal is for the “Industrial Strategy Council” to develop and 
refine “effective evaluation metrics” to measure the progress of quality 
work.39 Supiot’s thesis identifies the ways in which “evaluation metrics” are 
utterly destructive of the “quality of work.” For this reason, the Good Work 
Plan’s formula for achieving “quality work” will in fact be its undoing. What 
is needed is an approach focused on solidaristic democratic empowerment of 
workers, through representative organizations, so that these metrics are 
contested, shaped, and implemented through democratic engagement. 
Unfortunately, the entire corpus of restrictive trade union laws was outside 
the Taylor Review’s terms of reference, so there were very few concrete legal 
proposals on collective worker voice. 
In sum, Supiot’s work has provided us with a highly original and 
analytically powerful framework for theorizing labor law in the twenty-first 
century. Inevitably, for a major work in the longue duree genre, there are 
some important points of disagreement. For this reader, two of them are 
fundamental. First, Supiot is forthright in criticizing the EU institutions, and 
particularly the Court of Justice, for its “neoliberal deconstruction of labour 
law.”40 As evidence of this turn, which has “proved irreversible,” he cites the 
Viking and Laval cases41 and the Association de médiation sociale case.42 
The facts in Viking and Laval hardly need repetition in a labor law journal. 
In Association de médiation sociale, the Court concluded that Article 27 of 
the EU Charter, conferring a right to information and consultation, did not 
have horizontal effect. These cases are described by Supiot as exemplars of 
 
 36. A leading trade unionist described the Taylor Review as “wishy-washy” and “full of fluff”: Jason 
Moyer-Lee, Wishy-washy and full of fluff – the Taylor review offers little, THE GUARDIAN (July 18, 2017, 
7:27 AM), www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/18/taylor-review-gig-economy-workers. 
While this was addressed to the specific content of the proposals, I think that this language also reveals 
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“the Law and Economics doctrine, according to which every legal rule must 
be judged in terms of its economic effects.”43  
In contrast to Supiot, I think this economistic reading is too reductive. 
These decisions are—rightly—unsettling to many labor lawyers. In 
substance, Viking and Laval involved the sacrifice of fundamental social 
rights where they conflicted with the employer’s free movement rights under 
EU law. Yet it is possible to read Viking and Laval as also involving a 
difficult constitutional navigation of competing solidarities in an enlarging 
European Union. It is as much a conflict between the competing social and 
economic interests of workers from different member states as it is a conflict 
between the “social” and the “economic” or between capital and labor.44 
Furthermore, the Association de meditation sociale case was a disappointing 
failure in the use of the Charter by atypical workers seeking to maintain 
solidarity and enforce their collective rights. Yet there is now a litany of 
working time cases where Article 31 of the EU Charter has had powerful 
normative effects on the interpretation of the Working Time Directive.45 
There have also been important worker-protective developments under 
Article 47 of the EU Charter, and the effective enforcement of EU social 
law.46 
Admittedly, the Court’s encounter with collective forms of solidaristic 
empowerment has been more fraught. Still, the longue duree perspective 
obscures the complex strands that make up our contemporary legal and 
political practices. European labor and social law represent a contested 
normative site. Any attempt to impose a Procrustean uniformity on this field 
is highly problematic, and certainly so when it is filtered through selected 
landmark judgments like Viking and Laval. Like other forms of law, the 
cultural symbolism of European social law is rich and multi-layered. Perhaps 
U.K. labor lawyers are more sensitive to the worker-protective elements in 
that unfolding narrative, given our brutal experience of many decades of 
neoliberal deregulation. And there is a strong hermeneutic tradition in Anglo-
American jurisprudence that treats law as an argumentative practice, with 
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and Others v British Airways plc EU:C:2011:588; C-569/16, Stadt Wuppertal v Maria Elisabeth Bauer 
EU:C:2018:871. 
 46. Jeremias Prassl, Article 47 CFR and the Effective Enforcement of EU Labour Law: Teeth for 
Paper Tigers? Working Paper for Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
(April 2019).  
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legal interpretation as constructive interpretation, interpreting the material in 
its morally best light.47 At the current time, constructive interpretation of EU 
social law strikes me as a moral imperative. In an era of resurgent 
nationalism, it would be a profound mistake to give up on the very idea of 
European social law in totality. 
The second fundamental disagreement is on the “withering of the state” 
and the “dethronement of law.” Supiot presents these developments as very 
highly developed at the current time. His presentation of these processes is 
too categorical. Take the “withering of the state.” This fails to account for the 
resurgence of authoritarian populism and resurgent nationalism that has led 
to a dramatic reassertion of the coercive power of the nation-state. We can 
see these developments in Hungary, Poland, Italy, and the “Brexit” debacle 
in the United Kingdom. This re-forging of nationalistic community is often 
implemented through coercive primary legislation. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, the Immigration Act 2016 and the Trade Union Act 2016 both 
represent legal interventions constructed around the cultural symbolism of 
organic national unity.48 It could be read as the legislative assertion of a 
Schmittian politics of “friend” and “enemy,” with the “enemy” in the guise 
of the “illegal migrant” or the disruptive “cultural Marxist” trade unionist.49 
This development represents not the “withering” of the nationalistic state, but 
its recrudescence. The rise of nationalistic communitarianism, centered on 
the nation state, is the reaction against rampant marketization. An urgent task 
for our time is to salvage the social and inclusive nation-state, based upon 
decent migration regimes and respect for fundamental rights. At the very 
least, then, the “withering” thesis should be understood as a single strand in 
a rather complex set of vectors shaping the development of the modern state. 
I would regard the resurgence of the populist nation-state as one of the most 
important developments of our time, and it is difficult to locate it within 
Supiot’s intellectual mapping. It also means that it is particularly important 
to be precise in portraying the contours of Social Europe at a time when the 
EU might have a vital role to play in stabilizing decent work and decent 
politics across Europe. 
Now take the “dethronement of law.” This obscures the persistence and 
value of the general law to provide solutions to some of the problems being 
thrown up by the degradation of work. For example, a recent case in Ontario 
was concerned with the enforceability of a private arbitration clause that 
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compelled the individual to arbitrate in the Netherlands under Dutch law.50 
The arbitration clause was treated as invalid by the appeal court, in part 
because of the doctrine of unconscionability. This is an important 
development in resisting the encroachment of “governance by numbers” and 
law as marketized product. In the United Kingdom, the UKSC recently used 
the common law fundamental right of access to a court to strike down the 
tribunal fees regime that had effectively priced out the most vulnerable 
workers from enforcing their basic employment rights in a public court.51 
This was based upon a constitutional principle of the Rule of Law, which was 
formulated as a public good in the political community. These decisions are 
only possible because the law has not been “dethroned,” even though it may 
be experiencing tectonic pressures in a globalized world. National legal 
systems continue to provide workers with a law in common, some of it of 
ancient lineage and carrying deep symbolic meaning, and we do the law (and 
the workers) a disservice if we exaggerate its demise.  
In sum, Supiot’s work on “governance by numbers” should be read as 
the beginning of a research project, rather than its culmination. It reminds me 
of the literature around the “standard employment relationship.” Scholarship 
had been rather quick to declare the death, extinction, disappearance, or 
otherwise mortal condition of the standard employment relationship. More 
recent work has taken a more measured view of its position in labor 
markets.52 In a similar vein, we now need to examine some of the core claims 
of “governance by numbers” in the real world of work and social law. It is 
likely that the “withering of the state,” or the “dethronement of law,” or the 
rise of algorithmic control, represent important strands in a wider, complex 
and dynamic picture. 
In 1907, Mahler apparently said to Sibelius that “the symphony is like 
the world, it must encompass everything.”53 Supiot’s work is labor law on a 
Mahlerian scale. There are few labor law treatises that lead one through 
(amongst many others) Gödel, Livy, Cicero, Schmitt, Simone de Beauvoir 
and St. Paul. This is a book that demands much of its reader, but the rewards 
are rich indeed. 
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